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ANYTHING GOES THEOREM, INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND 
RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE HYPOTHESIS 
 
Dushko Josheski1  
 
Abstract 
In this paper, Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem 
(following the work of Sonnenchein (1972, 1973), Mantel (1974), and Debreu 
(1974)), has been applied to incomplete markets, Bottazzi, J.-M. and T. Hens (1996), 
in order to test the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. In the naïve economic 
environment where public debt has a perfect substitute in lump-sum taxes the RET 
fails if one allows payoff matrix of economic agents to vary. If the law of one price 
does not apply (if any two portfolios have equal payoffs than their prices should be 
equal too) and that the payoffs are risk free. 
 
Keywords: Anything Goes, RET hypothesis, incomplete markets, and equilibrium. 
 
JEL classification: C62, D50 
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 Incomplete markets and excess demand functions  
First, it is assumed n-commodity, m-consumers in a pure trade economy with a set of {𝒖𝒊} , 
strictly quasi concave (the negative of quasiconvex) , monotone utility functions. 𝒇: ℝ𝒍 → 𝑹   
is strictly quasi concave if 𝒇(𝝀𝒙𝟏 + (𝟏 − 𝝀)𝒙𝟐) > 𝐦𝐢𝐧 {𝒇(𝒙𝟏), 𝒇(𝒙𝟐)},holds for all 𝒙𝟏 , 
𝒙𝟐 ∈ ℝ
𝒍, with 𝒙𝟏 ≠ 𝒙𝟐 and all 𝝀 ∈ (𝟎, 𝟏). 1 For each n+1 commodity in the Walrasian 
equilibrium model it is generated excess demand correspondence (𝒇𝟏, 𝒇𝟐 … … … . 𝒇𝒍+𝟏) , 
Sonnenschein (1973), and the price functions and their domain is given as 𝑷 =
{𝒑𝟏, 𝒑𝟐 … … 𝒑𝒏}: 𝒑𝒊 > 𝟎 , ∀ 𝒊 . For the purpose of analysis, it is assumed two-commodity 
economy, and that there are no restrictions on the demand functions, i.e. demand depends on 
total income, the only restriction is 𝒑𝟐𝒙𝟐 = 𝒚 − 𝒑𝟏𝒙𝟏 where 𝒚 is income. The condition for 
continuity, Robbin, Joel W. (2010), here states that 𝒇 is said to be continuous on ℝ𝒍  if : 
equation 1 
∀𝒙𝟎 ∈ ℝ
𝒍∀𝝐 > 𝟎 ∃𝜹 > 𝟎 ∀𝒙 ∈ ℝ𝒍[|𝒙 − 𝒙𝟎| < 𝜹 |⇒ 𝒇(𝒙) − 𝒇(𝒙𝟎) < 𝝐|]  
In previous condition 𝝐 is trimmed price space 2, 𝒙𝟎 is vector parameter , hence why the PDF 
is of a form 𝒇𝒙𝟎(𝒙) = (𝒙 − 𝒙𝟎) .One such function as in equation 1 would be 𝒇(𝒙) = 𝒙. And 
the previous function is not continuous is: 
equation 2 
 ∀𝒙𝟎 ∈ ℝ
𝒍∀𝝐 > 𝟎 ∃𝜹 > 𝟎 ∀𝒙 ∈ ℝ𝒍[|𝒙 − 𝒙𝟎| < 𝜹 𝐚𝐧𝐝 |𝒇(𝒙) − 𝒇(𝒙𝟎) ≥ 𝝐|].  
Uniformly continuous function is given as : 
equation 3 
∀𝝐 > 𝟎  ∃𝜹 > 𝟎∀𝒙𝟎 ∈ ℝ
𝒍∀𝒙 ∈ ℝ𝒍[|𝒙 − 𝒙𝟎| < 𝜹 |⇒ 𝒇(𝒙) − 𝒇(𝒙𝟎) < 𝝐|] 
And is not strictly uniformly continuous function if : 
equation 4 
∀𝝐 > 𝟎  ∃𝜹 > 𝟎∀𝒙𝟎 ∈ ℝ
𝒍∀𝒙 ∈ ℝ𝒍[|𝒙 − 𝒙𝟎| < 𝜹 |𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝒇(𝒙) − 𝒇(𝒙𝟎) ≥ 𝝐|] 
Now if 𝒇: [𝒂, 𝒃] → 𝑹 and for some constant 𝑲 which is called Lipschitz constant  for 
∀𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐 ∈ [𝒂, 𝒃], then : 
equation 5  
 
|𝒇(𝒙𝟏) − 𝒇(𝒙𝟐)| ≤ 𝑲|𝒙𝟏 − 𝒙𝟐| 
                                           
1 Quasi concave function would be 𝑓(𝜆𝑥 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑦) ≥ min {𝑓(𝑥), 𝑓(𝑦)} 
2 Trimmed space as a location parameter class of probability functions that is parametrized by scalar 
or vector valued parameter 𝑥0 which determines distributions or shift of the distribution.  
267  
  
 
 
Or: 
Equation 6 
𝒅𝑹(𝒇(𝒙𝟏) − 𝒇(𝒙𝟐)) ≤ 𝑲𝒅ℝ𝒍(𝒙𝟏 − 𝒙𝟐)1 
Then the functions is called Lipschitz function and one can write ∈ 𝐋𝐢𝐩(𝒂, 𝒃) . Inverse 
mapping of Lipschitz is 𝒇−𝟏: 𝒇(𝒙) = 𝒙. This continuous function 𝒇: ℝ𝒏 → 𝑹 is an excess 
demand function of an n-commodity if for every 𝒑 in ℝ𝒍 , Walras’ Law with Equality 
𝒑𝒇(𝒑) = 𝟎, Debreu, (1974).But first let ℝ𝒏 = {𝒑 ∈ 𝑹| 𝒑 ≫ 𝟎, ‖𝒑‖ = 𝟏} , which is the set 
of positive price vectors in Euclidean form.  Debreu (1974), defines also consumer as a pair 
(≲. 𝝎) , where 𝒆 is endowment vector in 𝑹+. Than a function 𝒇: ℝ
𝒍 → 𝑹 is said to be 
individual excess demand function of the consumer (≲. 𝝎) if for every price 𝒑 in ℝ𝒍 , 𝝎 +
𝒇𝒑 is the greatest element for ≲ of {𝒙 ∈ ℝ𝒍+|𝒑𝒙 ≤ 𝒑𝝎}.Now, as in Mantel (1974), the 
domain of utility functions of consumers {𝒖𝒊}  is his trade set 𝚯𝒍, is 𝚯𝒍 − 𝒃𝒊 , where 𝒊 =
𝟏, 𝟐. . , 𝒍. Where 𝒃𝒊 is in the nonnegative orthant (like quadrant)  𝚯𝒍, of the n-dimensional 
Euclidean space ℝ𝒏.𝑬𝒏 are n-trade commodity economies with a finite number of consumers. 
In addition, 𝑭𝒏 is a set of all functions f-on a 𝝐- trimmed price space 𝚯𝒏(𝝐) =
{𝒑 ∈ 𝚯𝒍|𝝐 ≤ 𝒑𝒏 ≤ 𝟏/𝝐}. In addition, these functions are continuous as previously shown, 
homogenous 𝒇(𝝀𝒑) = 𝒇(𝒑). Cardinal number 𝒇 of 𝑭𝒏 is > 𝒄 2, Hobson(1907). First, 𝑭-has 
a part which is equivalent tot the continuum. This is straightforward since functions such as 
𝒇(𝒙) = 𝒄, where 𝒄 is any number of the continuum , constitute such a part. It follows that 
𝒇 ≥ 𝒄. Now, we assume that 𝑭 is equivalent to a part of the continuum, and it is proven that 
such a part cannot have a cardinal number< 𝒄. This 𝑭 –function can be ordered in the same 
type as the continuum, so that any assigned number in the continuum  , there corresponds a 
definite set of rules 𝑹𝛏, which defines a function  𝒇𝛏. The aggregate function 𝑭(𝒙) must 
contain every definable function of a real variable. We may consider  𝒇𝝃(𝛏) as a function of 
𝛏, because its value can be arithmetically determined and therefore is an element of 𝑭 
aggregate of all functions. Now to define a norm3, we choose a fixed number, let us say 
unity, we choose one, then the functions 𝝓(𝝃) = 𝒇𝝃(𝛏) + 𝟏, so now at each point  , value of 
unity is added. New definable function now is 𝝓(𝒙), but this cannot possibly belong to 
aggregate 𝑭, 𝝓(𝒙) cannot be identical with  𝒇𝝃𝟏(𝒙) ,  because 𝝓(𝝃𝟏) and 𝒇𝝃𝟏(𝝃𝟏), they differ 
by unity. So now 𝑭 cannot be equivalent to the continuum and thus theorem 𝒇 > 𝒄 is put in 
practices, meaning that the aggregate of all functions of a real variable has a cardinal number 
𝒇 higher than 𝒄.About the initial endowment of the consumer we assume that ∑ 𝝎 ≫ 𝟎𝒊 . 
                                           
1 Distance d from 𝑥1 to 𝑥2 is |𝑥1 − 𝑥2|  
2 The cardinal number of the aggregate of all functions defined for the rational points only is the 
cardinal number of the ways of distributing on the aggregate of rational numbers the aggregate number 
of continuum.  
3 A norm is a real valued function 𝜈 ⟼ ‖𝜈‖ 
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Initial endowment vector 𝝎𝒊 ∈ ℝ
𝒍. Ownership share of firms is 𝜽 ≥ 𝟎, ∀ 𝒋, 𝒋 = 𝟏, … , 𝑱. 
Vector of prices is 𝒑 = 𝒑𝟏, 𝒑𝟐, … . . , 𝒑𝒍 is said to be Walrasian if it “clears “ all of the markets, 
that is only if it solves L equations in L unknowns, Mas-Colell, A, and Whinston, M.,and 
Green, J.,, (1995) :𝒛(𝒑) = 𝟎. This vector of prices is  the inverse demand function, in our 
case is F- function . And for n-consumers , their preferences are 𝒙𝒊 = ℝ+
𝒍  and ≳𝒍 strictly 
convex1 and strictly monotone. Now, a note on properties of preferences in terms of utilities, 
Obara.,I,(2012),: 
≿ 𝒐𝒏  𝑿 2is locally nonsatiated if ∀𝒙 ∈ 𝑿 , 𝝐 > 𝟎, ∃𝒚 ∈ 𝑿 , ‖𝒚 − 𝒙‖ < 𝝐, ⋀ 𝒖(𝒚) > 𝒖(𝒙) 
≿ 𝒐𝒏  𝑿 is monotone ⇔ 𝒙 ≫ 𝒚, ⋀ 𝒖(𝒚) > 𝒖(𝒙) , ∀𝒙, 𝒚 ∈ 𝑿 , 𝒙 > 𝒚 ⇒ 𝒙 ≳ 𝒚 
≿ 𝒐𝒏  𝑿 is convex ⇔ 𝒖 𝐢𝐬 𝐪𝐮𝐚𝐬𝐢 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐚𝐯𝐞 𝒖(𝒚) ≥ 𝒖(𝒙), 𝒖(𝒛) ≥ 𝒖(𝒙), 𝒖(𝒂𝒚 + (𝟏 −
𝒂)𝒛) ≥ 𝒙, ∀𝒂 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏] 
≿ 𝒐𝒏  𝑿 is strictly convex ⇔ 𝒖 𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐥𝐲 𝐪𝐮𝐚𝐬𝐢 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐚𝐯𝐞 𝒖(𝒚) ≥ 𝒖(𝒙), 𝒖(𝒛) ≥
𝒖(𝒙), 𝒚 ≠ 𝒛, 𝒖(𝒂𝒚 + (𝟏 − 𝒂)𝒛) > 𝒙, ∀𝒂 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏] 
Proposition : ≿ is differentially strictly convex if as in  Mas-Colell, A. (1986)3 , Jacobian 
determinant is nonsinugaler i.e. non zero: 
|
𝝏𝟐𝒖(𝒙) 𝝏𝒖(𝒙)
[𝝏𝒖(𝒙)]𝑻 𝑶
| ≠ 𝟎 
Also as previous we assume that ∑ 𝝎 ≫ 𝟎𝒊  (level of income or wealth), now the inverse 
aggregate demand function , 𝝋(𝒑, 𝝎) defined for all price vectors 𝒑 ≫ 𝟎, satisfies the 
following properties: 
𝝋(∙) is continuous function on ℝ++
𝒍 × ℝ+
𝒍  
𝝋(∙) is homogenous of degree zero ,  𝝋(𝜶𝒑, 𝜶𝝎) =  𝝋(𝒑, 𝝎), ∀(𝒑, 𝝎),∗> 𝟎 
𝒑𝝋(𝒑) = 𝟎 ∀𝒑 (Walras law)  
If 𝒑𝒍 → 𝒑, 𝒑 ≠ 𝟎, 𝒑𝒍 = 𝟎 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐦𝐞 𝒍 so, 𝐦𝐚𝐱{𝝋𝟏(𝒑
𝒍), … . . , 𝝋𝒍(𝒑
𝒍)} → ∞ 
                                           
1 Second welfare theorem: If all agents have convex preferences, then there always will be set prices 
such that Pareto Efficient allocation is a market equilibrium allocation for an appropriate assignment 
of endowments.  
2 Preference relation ≿ is a relation ≳⊂ ℝ+
𝑙 × ℝ+
𝑙 .With properties 𝑥 ≿ 𝑥, ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ+
𝑙  (reflexivity), 𝑥 ≿
𝑦, 𝑦 ≿ 𝑧 ⇒ 𝑥 ≿ 𝑧 (transitivity), ≿ is a closed set (continuity), ∀(𝑥 ≿ 𝑦), ∃(𝑦 ≿ 𝑥)  (completeness) 
,given ≳, ∀ (𝑥 ≫ 0) the at least good set {y: y ≳ x }is closed relative to 𝑅𝑙   (boundary condition), 
𝐴 is convex, 𝑖𝑓 {y: y ≳ x }is convex set for every y , 𝑎𝑦 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥 ≳ 𝑥, whenever y ≳ x  𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 <
𝑎 < 1 , Mas-Colell, A. (1986). 
3 Big O here may represent infinitesimal asymptotics  or a product of two matrices  
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About the set of prices… 𝑺𝝎 = {𝒑 ∈ 𝑺|∀𝒊, 𝒑𝒊 ≧ 𝝐 } , then 𝝋𝒍(𝒑) > −𝒔 for every commodity 
𝒍 and every 𝒑. 
Budget function can be given as : 𝜷(𝒑, 𝝎) = {𝒙 ∈ 𝑹++
𝒍 : 𝒑 ∗ 𝒙 ≤ 𝝎} 
Expenditure function is ?̅?  ∈ 𝒖(𝑹++
𝒍 ) is defined as 𝒆?̅? ∈ 𝒖(𝑹++
𝒍 ), and is homogenous of 
degreeone, concave, and of class , 𝑪𝟏 (continuous differentiable whose derivative is 
continuous ,i.e. continuously differentiable, 𝝏𝒆?̅?(𝒑) =) = 𝒉𝒖(𝒑)1. 
Proposition: ∀(𝒑, 𝝎), 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒕. 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒙 𝝏𝒑𝝋(𝒑, 𝝎) + 𝝏𝝎𝝋(𝒑, 𝝎)(𝝋(𝒑, 𝝎))
𝑻
<
𝟎, 𝑯𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒙 𝜶𝒊𝒋 = ?̅?𝒋𝒊 , 𝒐𝒏 𝑻𝒑: {𝝊: 𝒑 ∙ 𝝊 = 𝟎} 
The aggregate production function in this economy would be :𝒀 = {𝒚 ∈ ℝ𝒍; 𝒚 ≤
∑ 𝜶𝒊𝒂𝒋 ,(𝒂𝟏, … . , 𝒂𝒋)𝒋 ≥ 𝟎}. In previous function 𝜶𝒊𝒂𝒋 , are basic activities of the firms , i.e 
the vector of level activities . Because preferences are strictly monotone, there can be no free 
goods at an equilibrium. Equilibrium exist with a pair(𝒑, 𝒂), formed by a price vector 𝒑 ∈
𝑺 𝒐𝒓 𝒑 ∈ ℝ+
𝒍 , if and only if :𝝋(𝒑) − ∑ 𝜶𝒊𝒂𝒋 ,𝒋 = 𝟎. Differentiability of the excess demand 
function implies continuity. Now by differentiating both sides of 𝝋(𝝀𝒑) = 𝝋(𝒑) with 
respect to 𝝀 > 𝟎 and then evaluating at 𝝀 = 𝟏, we obtain: 
equation 7 
∑
𝝏𝒛𝒍(𝒑)
𝝏𝒑𝒌
𝒌 𝒑𝒌 = 𝟎     ∀ 𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑 [𝑫𝝋(𝒑)𝒑 = 𝟎] 
∑
𝝏𝒛𝒌(𝒑)
𝝏𝒑𝒍
𝒌 𝒑𝒌 = −𝝋𝒍(𝒑) ∀ 𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑 𝑫𝝋(𝒑)𝒑 = −𝝋(𝒑) 
These previous results come from Euler formula for homogenous functions. Formally, lets 
suppose that 𝒇(𝒙𝟏, … , 𝒙𝒍)  is homogenous of degree r (𝒓 = ⋯ . . , −𝟏, 𝟎, 𝟏, … . ) and it is 
differentiable. Then at any (?̅?𝟏, … . . , ?̅?𝒍)  there is : 
equation 8 
∑
𝝏𝒇(?̅?𝟏,…..,?̅?𝒏)
𝝏𝒙𝒍
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ?̅?𝒍 = 𝒓𝒇(?̅?𝟏, … . . , ?̅?𝒍) or in matrix notation 𝛁𝒇(?̅?) ∗ ?̅? = 𝒓𝒇(?̅?) 
By definition, we have: 𝒇(𝒕?̅?𝟏, … . . , 𝒕?̅?𝑳) − 𝒕
𝒓𝒇(?̅?𝟏, … . . , ?̅?𝒍) = 𝟎, differentiating previous 
with respect to t , we have ∑
𝝏𝒇(𝒕?̅?𝟏,…..,𝒕?̅?𝑵)
𝝏𝒙𝒍
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ?̅?𝒍 − 𝒓𝒕
𝒓−𝟏𝒇(?̅?𝟏, … . . , ?̅?𝒍) = 𝟎.For a function 
that is homogenous of degree zero Euler formula says : ∑
𝝏𝒇(?̅?𝟏,…..,?̅?𝒍)
𝝏𝒙𝒍
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ?̅?𝒍 = 𝟎.   
Pseudoequilibrium in incomplete markets  
                                           
1 Compensated demand function  
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Pseudo equilibrium occurs if the initial share market is cleared and and share prices are 
positive at every date -event, provided that no consumer can be satiated at any event date 
pair. There exist two dates 0 and 1. This is a case of sequential trade under uncertainty. 
Equilibrium here is a set of prices at a first date, a set of common price expectations for the 
future, and a consistent set of individual plans for consumers and producers, so that each 
individual plan is optimal for the agent, given the appropriate budgetary constraints, Radner, 
R., (1972). So at date 1 trade exchange occurs and 𝓵 commodities are spot traded by the 
following prices 𝒑𝒔 ∈ ℝ++
𝒍  Furthermore, ∑ 𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒄
𝒍
𝒊=𝟏  is the commodity claimed by the 
individual if state 𝒔 occurs, 𝒙𝒔𝒄 is commodity 𝒄 = 𝟏, 𝟐 … , 𝑪 produced. So that, ∑ 𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒄
𝒍
𝒊=𝟏 =
𝒙𝒔𝒄 , Arrow , K., (1953), assuming absence of saturation of individuals.  Economy is subject 
to restraint ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝒔𝒄 ∗ 𝒙𝒔𝒄 = 𝒚𝒊
𝑪
𝒄=𝟏
𝑺
𝒔=𝟏 .Arrow sets theorem that is utility 𝑽𝒊(𝒙𝟏, … . . , 𝒙𝒔𝒄) is 
quasiconcave  for every individual 𝒊 , then any optimal risk bearing allocation can be realized 
by a system of competitive markets in claims on commodities. There are precisely 𝑺 types 
of securities1; unit of security of the sth type is a claim paying one monetary unit if state 𝒔 
occurs and zero otherwise. Now, 𝒒𝒔 is the price of security ?̅?𝒔𝒄 = 𝒒𝒔𝒑𝒔𝒄. Price of securities 
is more precisely 𝒒𝒔 =
∑ ∑ ?̅?𝒔𝒄∗𝒙𝒔𝒄
𝑪
𝒄=𝟏
𝑺
𝒔=𝟏
𝒚
 , or 𝒒𝒔 =
𝒚𝒊
𝒚
. Budget restraint divided by income. Or 
∑ 𝒒𝒔 =
∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝒔𝒄∗𝒙
∗
𝒊𝒔𝒄
𝑪
𝒄=𝟏
𝑺
𝒔=𝟏
𝑰
𝒊=𝟏
𝒚
=
∑ 𝒚𝒊
𝑰
𝒊=𝟏
𝒚
𝑺
𝒊=𝟏 = 𝟏. At date 0 there is trade on 𝑲 ≤ 𝑺 assets, i.e. 
number of Arrow-Debreu securities is less or equal than the states of nature. Unit of assets 
𝒌, delivers a return vector 𝜶𝒌𝒔 ∈ 𝑹𝒔
𝒍  of goods if state 𝒔 occurs. We also denote that 𝒚𝒊 ∈ 𝑹
𝒌 
and 𝒙𝒊 ∈ 𝑹+
𝒍𝒔 , these are the trade and consumption plans of agent 𝒊.Now by definition: The 
plans (?̅?, ?̅?) and prices 𝒒 ∈ 𝑹𝒌 and 𝒑 ∈ 𝑹+
𝒍𝒔 constitute equilibrium if : 
Equation 9 
∀(?̅?𝒊, ?̅?𝒊), 𝐦𝐚𝐱 𝒖𝒊(𝒙𝒊)  𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐣𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝒒 ∗ 𝒚𝒊 ≤ 𝟎, 𝒑𝒔𝒙𝒊𝒔 ≤ 𝒑𝒔𝝎𝒊𝒔 + ∑ 𝒚𝒊𝒌(𝜶𝒌𝒔 ∗ 𝒑𝒔), 𝒇𝒐𝒓 ∀𝒔𝒌   
∑ 𝒚𝒊 = 𝟎𝒊  ∑ (𝒙𝒊 − 𝝎𝒊) ≤ 𝟎𝒊  
The pair (?̅?, ?̅?) ∈ 𝑹+
𝒍𝒔 × 𝑹+
𝒍𝒔𝑵  constitutes equilibrium if : 
∀𝒙, 𝐦𝐚𝐱 𝒖𝒊(𝒙𝒊)𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐣𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝒑𝒙𝒊 ≤ 𝒑𝝎𝒊 , ⋀(𝒑𝒊 ∗ (𝒙𝒊𝟏 − 𝝎𝒊𝟏), … . . , (𝒑𝒔 ∗ (𝒙𝒊𝒔 − 𝝎𝒊𝒔)
∈ 𝑳(𝒑) ⊂ 𝑹𝑺 
∑(𝒙𝒊 − 𝝎𝒊) ≤ 𝟎
𝒊
 
                                           
1 When security is sold, when 𝑠 state occurs, money is transferred in a way determined by the 
securities, and the allocation of commodities occurs at market in a usual way, without further risk 
bearing.  
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Here we denote that 𝑮𝑺,𝑲 = {𝑳(𝒑) ⊂ 𝑹𝑺: 𝑳 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝑲 𝒅𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒆}, this is 
Grassman manifold1 of K planes in 𝑹𝑺 .And  for ∀𝒑 ⋀ 𝑳 ∈ ?̃?𝑺,𝑲 = ⋃ 𝑮𝑺,𝑲𝒌′≤𝒌 , and 
𝒇(𝒑, 𝑳) ∈ 𝑹𝒍𝑺 is the excess aggregate demand vector and the consumption set for every 
consumer is {𝒙𝒊 ∈ 𝑹+
𝒍𝒔: (𝒑𝒊)(𝒙𝒊 − 𝝎𝒊), … . . , (𝒑𝒔)(𝒙𝒔 − 𝝎𝒔) ∈ 𝑳}. And the pair(𝒑, 𝑳) ∈
𝑹++
𝒍𝒔 × ?̃?𝑺,𝑲, constitutes equilibrium if: 𝒇(𝒑, 𝑳) = 𝟎, 𝑳 = 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒔𝒑𝒂𝒏 (𝒈𝟏(𝒑), … , 𝒈𝒌(𝒑)).  
Return vector is 𝒈𝒌(𝒑) = 𝒑𝒊𝜶𝒌𝒊, … , 𝒑𝒔𝜶𝒌𝒔.And now if  𝑳 = 𝑹
𝑺 , it is ok, with the result this 
is complete market case. And in such a case beyond Budget constraint there will be no 
restrictions on transfer of purchasing power across states of nature. However, since 𝑲 < 𝑺 
this is incomplete market case. So , in general pair (𝒑, 𝑳) ∈ 𝑹++
𝒍𝒔 × ?̃?𝑺,𝑲, constitutes pseudo 
equilibrium if : 
𝒇(𝒑, 𝑳) = 𝟎 
𝒈𝒌(𝒑) ∈ 𝑳, 𝒇𝒐𝒓 ∀ (𝒌 = 𝟏, … , 𝑲 
(𝒑, 𝑳) is an equilibrium if {𝒈𝟏(𝒑), … … … . , 𝒈𝒌(𝒑)} are linearly independent. About the 
questions of existence of pseudo equilibrium, first one can define unit norms such as: 
𝒇(𝒑(𝑳), 𝑳) = 𝟎 and 𝒈𝒊(𝑳) = 𝒈𝒊𝑷(𝑳). So given 𝑲 functions 𝒈𝒊: 𝑮
𝑺,𝑲 → 𝑹𝑺 there is an 𝑳 such 
that 𝒈𝒊(𝑳) ∈ 𝑳, ∀𝒊, also each function is continuous. One can define a section of the vector 
bundle 𝝈, and L yields equilibrium if and only if 𝝈(𝑳) = 𝝈𝟎(𝑳), and 𝝈𝟎  is zero intersection 
and a reason for establishing pseudo equilibrium, because every bundle must intersect at zero 
intersection. In  Radner, R., (1972), setting stock price –share price system is (𝒑, 𝝑) , safe 
asset is 𝒓 = (𝒄𝟏, … . , 𝒄𝒓), 𝑺 Arrow assets are : 𝒓𝒔𝒔 = 𝟏, 𝐨𝐫 𝒓𝒌𝒔 = 𝟎 ,the strike price 𝒄, at 
which put or call option can be exercised on primary asset 𝒓𝒌 is given by: 
{
𝒓𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝐦𝐚𝐱 (𝟎, 𝒓𝒌𝒔 − 𝒄)𝟏≤𝒔≤𝑺
𝒓𝒑𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝐦𝐚𝐱 (𝟎, 𝒄 − 𝒓𝒌𝒔)𝟏≤𝒔≤𝑺
. ∑ 𝒛𝒊
𝑲
𝒊=𝟏 ∈ 𝑹
𝒌 is allowable contract (allowable 
portfolio of assets) , a commodity bundle is : ∑ 𝒙𝒊𝒔 ∈ 𝑹+
𝑳𝑺𝑳𝑺
𝒊𝒔=𝟏 . In equilibrium utility, 
function:𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝑𝟎(?̅? − 𝒇𝟎)𝑼𝒊(𝒙𝒊 = ?̃?𝒊, 𝒛𝒊𝒎𝒎 = ?̅?𝒊𝒎 − ?̃?𝒊𝒎 = 𝟎, 𝒚𝒋 = ∑ (?̃?𝒊𝒎 − ?̅?𝒊𝒎) 𝒊 ∈𝒊
𝑰, 𝒋 ∈ 𝑱, Here 𝒎 are all such markets in the economy, ?̃?𝒊 is pseudo value of 𝒙𝒊, 𝒚𝒋 is the 
production function in economy, this function is maximized subject to: ∑ 𝝑𝒊𝒌𝒛𝒊𝒌 ≤ 𝟎𝒌 , and  
∀𝒔, ∑ 𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒔𝒙𝒊𝒍𝒔 = ∑ 𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒔𝝎𝒊𝒍𝒔𝑰𝑰 + 𝝑𝒊𝒔 ∑ 𝒓𝒌𝒔𝒛𝒊𝒌𝒌 . In pseudo equilibrium allocation of resources 
and prices is:(𝒛, 𝒙) ∈ 𝑹𝒌𝑰 × 𝑹+
𝑳𝑺𝑰, (𝒑, 𝝑) ∈ 𝑹+
𝑲+𝑳𝑺.In market clearing in pseudo equilibrium 
∑ ?̃?𝒊𝒎
𝑰
𝒊=𝟏 − ∑ ?̅?𝒊𝒎
𝑰
𝒊=𝟏 ≫ 𝟎, so that ∑ ?̃?𝒊𝒎
𝑰
𝒊=𝟏 ≪ ∑ ?̅?𝒊𝒎
𝑰
𝒊=𝟏 . Bottazzi, J.-M. and T. Hens 
(1996), obtain first SMD incomplete markets result. They use  Radner, R., (1972), but 
without short sale constraints. There are 𝒌 ≤ 𝑺 real assets, each of these assets can be 
purchased or sold at price,  𝒒𝒌 at date 0. 𝑳 → 𝒛(𝑳) is a continuous homogenous function, 
𝒛(𝑳) is excess demand function, also 𝑳 ∈ 𝑮++
𝒌 (𝑹𝒏) = {𝑳 ∈ 𝑮𝒌(𝑹𝒏), 𝑳 ∩ 𝑹+
𝒏 = {𝟎}}, and 
𝒛(𝑳) ∈ 𝑳,there is an economy such that for every 𝑳 in a compact subset of 𝑮++
𝒌 (𝑹𝒏), 𝒛(𝑳) is 
                                           
1 A Grassmann manifold is a certain collection of vector subspaces of a vector space. 
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the aggregate excess demand function when consumers maximize their utility in their net 
trade span 𝑳 − 𝑹𝒏. Goods space dimension in this model is given as: 𝒎 = (𝑺 + 𝟏)𝒍 , excess 
demand is given as :𝒛 = (𝒛𝒐, … . , 𝒛𝒔) ∈ ℝ
(𝑺+𝟏)𝒍,also 𝑳 → 𝜷(𝑳)𝒆(𝑳), where 𝒆 is vector, and 
𝒆(𝑳) is perpendicular or orthogonal projection of a Euclidean vector, 𝜷 is positive real valued 
function, and 𝜷(𝑳)𝒆(𝑳) is individual demand function. Budget set for every agent is given 
as: 𝜷(𝒑, 𝒒) = {𝒛 ∈ ℝ(𝑺+𝟏)𝒍|𝜽 ∈ 𝑹𝒌, ?̅?𝒛𝟎 + 𝜽𝒒 = 𝟎, 𝒑𝒔𝒛𝒔 =  𝒑𝒔(𝑨𝒔𝜽𝒔), 𝒔 = 𝟏, … , 𝑺}. In 
previous expression 𝜽 is portfolio consumption, 𝒒 is share price or security price, 𝑨𝒔 
represents real assets. Now, proposition is set that 𝝅 ∈ ℝ(𝑺+𝟏)𝒍 ∩ 𝑳(𝒑)⊥ = 𝑳(𝝀(𝒑)⊥: 𝑳(𝒑) =
𝑳(𝒛), where 𝝅 is property of real assets, now since vector 𝒆 − 𝒆(𝒑) ∈ 𝑳(𝒑)⊥.Now, since  
𝒆 − 𝒆(𝒑) ∈ 𝑳(𝒑)⊥ > 𝟎, 𝒆 − 𝒆(𝒑) ∈ 𝑳(𝒑)⊥ ∩ 𝑳(𝒑′)⊥.So, now 𝒆 − 𝒆(𝒑) is magnitude of 
incompleteness or the price of (𝑺 − 𝒌) which is the magnitude of incompleteness. Now if 
𝑳(?̅?) (maximal dimension of goods prices)1, has a maximal dimension, than every 
homogenous continuous function 𝒛 which satisfies Walras’ law i.e.𝒛(𝒑) ∈ 𝑳(𝒑) is the excess 
demand function of an 𝒎-consumer economy in an equilibrium (or not equilibrium) price ?̅?. 
Now, 𝒎 number of agents should be minimal. In a, one good finance models, with zero 
portfolio consumption 𝜽 = 𝟎, following  utility of agents ?̃?(𝜽) = 𝒖(𝑨 ∗ 𝜽 + 𝝎) applies, 
where 𝝎 is resource endowment, and this utility function is maximized s.t. 𝒒 ∗ 𝜽 = 𝟎. So 
that now number of goods minus magnitude of incompleteness is 𝒎 = (𝑺 + 𝟏)𝒍 − (𝑺 − 𝒌) 
,is 𝒎 = (𝑺 + 𝟎)𝟏 − (𝑺 − 𝒌) = 𝒌.Minimal number of consumers should be 𝒎 − 𝟏.So that 
aggregate excess demand function is a sum from 1 to 𝒎  of all individual excess demand 
functions, in local of ?̅?,i.e. 𝒛(𝒑) = ∑ 𝜷𝒊(𝒑)𝒆𝒊(𝒑)
𝒎
𝒊=𝟏 , this is generated in environment of 
strictly convex preferences. In previous expression, 𝜷𝒊(𝒑) ∈ 𝑹++, 𝒆𝒊(𝒑) =
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒋𝑳(𝒑)(𝒆𝒊).There exist 𝒎 points (?̂?𝒊, … . , ?̂?𝒎) ∈ 𝑳(?̅?) in the interior of nonempty convex 
set (𝑪) 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒏(𝑪): = {𝒑 ∈ 𝑪: ∀𝒒 ∈ 𝑪 ∃𝒒 > 𝟏: 𝝀𝒑 + (𝟏 − 𝝀)𝒒𝝐𝑪}.Direct sum of this convex 
preferences (𝑴 = (𝑪(𝒆𝒊, … . , 𝒆𝒎) = 𝒆𝒎 + (𝒆𝟏 − 𝒆𝒎, … , 𝒆𝒎−𝟏 − 𝒆𝒎 and orthogonal 𝑳(𝒑)
⊥ 
goods space should equal goods space dimension, i.e. 𝑴 ⊕ 𝑳(𝒑)⊥ = ℝ(𝑺+𝟏)𝒍. For every 
function 𝒛 for which Walras’ law, continuity and homogeneity applies, there exists 
neighbourhood of no arbitrage prices(?̅?, ?̅?), and ?̅?  is such that the return matrix has max 
rank, 𝒛  then is the aggregate excess demand function of 𝒎 economy. This result applies for 
𝒎 − 𝟏 consumers only. So now, law of one price applies only in the case 𝒛(𝒑) =
∑ 𝜷𝒊(𝒑)𝒆𝒊(𝒑)
𝒎−𝟏
𝒊=𝟏 .This is also critical proof for the RET theorem in the last section. Since, 
individual excess demand functions can be identified locally, the last proof applies to them 
also. Norm defined here is 𝒑𝒆(𝒛) =
𝒆−?̅?
‖𝒆−?̅?‖
, where ?̅? is the closest point from 𝒛 to 𝒆. And, 
𝒑𝒆(𝜷(?̅?)𝒆(?̅?)) = 𝝀?̅?, 𝜷(?̅?) = 𝟏, 𝝀 > 𝟎.Also defined is 𝑳(𝒑𝒆(𝒛)), and 𝒛 =
𝜷 (𝒑𝒆(𝒆(?̅?))) 𝒆(?̅?), andL𝑳 (𝒑𝒆(𝒆(?̅?))) 𝒆(?̅?) = 𝑳(𝒑) , this applies if 𝒑 = ?̅?, which is true 
in 𝑳(𝒑)⊥. 
                                           
1 ?̅? is such that the 𝑆 × 𝑘 matrix or 𝑝𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝑠, has rank K. In the simplest case if it is 2 × 2 matrix with 
two states 0 and 1 rank will be one i.e.  𝑘 = 1 
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Nonexistence of equilibrium in incomplete markets  
Hart, (1975), has shown that under standard assumptions equilibrium may not exist in 
incomplete markets. In this model there are two assets and tow states (𝓵 = 𝟐 and 𝑺 =
𝟐 𝒐𝒓 𝟑 ), in matrix form:𝒂𝟏𝟏 = (𝟏, 𝟎), 𝒂𝟏𝟐 = (𝟏, 𝟎), 𝒂𝟐𝟏 = (𝟎, 𝟏), 𝒂𝟐𝟐 = (𝟎, 𝟏). Markets 
are complete when goods equals consumption set i.e. 𝑳 = 𝑹𝟐, and if prices are not collinear, 
it means that the relative prices are not same. Otherwise 𝑳 > 𝟎 and contains some positive 
vector,𝒇(𝒑, 𝑳(𝒑)) = 𝒇(𝒑, 𝟎), it is as if no transfer was possible across the two states. Optimal 
portfolios are given as: 𝝋𝒊
∗ ∈ 𝑹𝑲, optimal consumption plans are 𝒙𝒊
∗ = {𝒙𝟏𝒊
∗ , … . . , 𝒙𝟏𝑺
∗  } is our 
case with two states and two dates : 𝒙𝟏
𝒊 = 𝑹+
𝟐  and 𝒙𝟐
𝒊 = 𝑹+
𝟐  are consumption of agent 𝒊, at 
date 1 and date 2. Spot markets open at date 1 or 2 and futures market are costly to organize 
and futures are not permitted. There are no borrowing no lending possibilities and goods 
cannot be stored. Utility function here is: 𝑼𝒊(𝒙𝟏
𝒊 , 𝒙𝟐
𝒊 ) = 𝑽𝒊(𝒙𝟏
𝒊 ) + 𝜷𝒊𝑾𝒊(𝒙𝟐
𝒊 ). Endowments 
of agents at date 1 and 2 are given as : 𝝎𝟏
𝒊 ∈ 𝑹+
𝟐  and 𝝎𝟐
𝒊 ∈ 𝑹+
𝟐  . And utility 𝑼𝒊(𝒙𝟏
𝒊 , 𝒙𝟐
𝒊 ) is 
maximized subject to: 𝒑𝟏𝒙𝟏
𝒊 ≤  𝒑𝟏𝝎𝟏
𝒊  and 𝒑𝟐𝒙𝟐
𝒊 ≤  𝒑𝟐𝝎𝟐
𝒊  and 𝒙𝟏
𝒊 , 𝒙𝟐
𝒊 ≥ 𝟎. Price system also 
is ordered pair:(𝒑, 𝒒) , 𝒑 is a goods price system and 𝒒 is security price system. Securities 
indexation is: 𝒇 = 𝑭 + 𝟏, … . , 𝑭 + 𝑮, and security 𝒇 is represented by a functions 𝒂𝟐
𝒇
, 𝒂𝟑
𝒇
 that 
map S into 𝑹+
𝑯 which is set of goods in the economy. 𝒂𝟐
𝒇
, 𝒂𝟑
𝒇
 we consider like dividends which 
security pays. If consumer holds 𝝋 units of security 𝒇 and if state 𝒔 occurs, the consumer will 
receive vector of goods 𝝋𝒂𝟑
𝒇
 at date 3. At this date futures market close, and goods markets 
open. Security trading plan for agent 𝒊 is given as: 𝝋𝒊 = 𝝋𝟏
𝒊 , 𝝋𝟐
𝒊 . At first date (1) budget 
constraint is: 𝒑𝟏(𝒔)𝒙𝟏
𝒊 (𝒔) + 𝒒𝟏(𝒔)𝝋𝟏
𝒊 (𝒔) ≤ 𝒑𝟏(𝒔)𝝎𝟏
𝒊 (𝒔). At second date budget constrain is: 
𝒑𝟐(𝒔)𝒙𝟐
𝒊 (𝒔) + 𝒒𝟐(𝒔)𝝋𝟐
𝒊 (𝒔) ≤ 𝒑𝟐(𝒔)𝝎𝟐
𝒊 (𝒔) + 𝒑𝟐(𝒔) (∑ 𝝋𝟏
𝒇(𝒔)+𝒂𝟐
𝒇𝑭
𝒇=𝟏 ) +
∑ 𝒒𝟐𝒇(𝒔)𝝋𝟏
𝒇(𝒔)𝑭𝒇=𝟏  or 𝒑𝟑(𝒔)𝒙𝟑
𝒊 (𝒔) ≤ 𝒑𝟑(𝒔)𝝎𝟑
𝒊 (𝒔) + 𝒑𝟑(𝒔) (∑ 𝝋𝟐𝒇
𝒊 (𝒔)+𝒂𝟑
𝒇
(𝒔)𝑭+𝑮𝒇=𝟏 ).And 
therefore for a consumption allocation is said to be Pareto optimal if it is not Pareto 
dominated by other array of consumption plans, that is : 𝑼𝒊(𝒙′𝒊) = 𝑼𝒊(𝒙𝒊), ∀𝒊.But because 
the goods in economy are gross substitutes, following rule applies : ↓ 𝒑 ⇒↓ 𝒙, and if ↑ 𝒑 ⇒
↑ 𝒙 , also 
𝝏𝒙
𝝏𝒑
> 𝟎.Therefore, 
𝒒𝟏(𝒔)
𝒒𝟐(𝒔)
=
𝒑𝟏(𝒔)
𝒑𝟐(𝒔)
 for 𝒔 = 𝟏, 𝟐. And in equilibrium,
𝒑𝟏(𝟏)
𝒑𝟐(𝟏)
=
𝒑𝟏(𝟐)
𝒑𝟐(𝟐)
= 𝟏, 
this contradicts assumption in equilibrium that 𝒑𝟏 and 𝒑𝟐 are linearly independent. Second 
case in equilibrium is if 𝒑𝟏 and 𝒑𝟐 are linearly dependent. There is only one security at date 
1 and therefore there is no way of transferring wealth from state 1 to state 2, and we are 
assuming that in equilibrium there is no trading at date 1.  Prices are normalized to unity 
meaning that 𝒑(𝟏) = (
𝟏
𝟑
,
𝟐
𝟑
) and 𝒑(𝟐) = (
𝟐
𝟑
,
𝟏
𝟑
), so they are linearly independent vectors .And 
since two cases are being ruled out means that there is no possible equilibrium for this 
economy.  
Taxes and incomplete markets  
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Government produces nothing, imposes tax and collects taxes, and distributes proceeds, and 
receives net income:𝒈𝒓 = 𝒕 ∗ ?̅? − ∑ 𝒈
𝒉
𝑯 . In previous expression 𝒈
𝒉 are net lump sum 
government transfers to household 𝒉,1 and taxes are the difference between produced and 
consumed goods: 𝒕 ≡ (𝒙𝒉 − 𝒙𝒑). Now differentiating government revenue 𝒈𝒓 with respect 
to 𝒕 of the previous expression gives the following result: 
𝒅𝒈𝒓
𝒅𝒕
=
𝒅?̅?
𝒅𝒕
∗ 𝒕 − ∑ 𝒈𝒉𝑯 . Also. ?̅? =
∑ ?̅?𝒉𝑯  (sum of numeraire consumption). Stiglitz et al. (1986), further defines 
𝒅𝒈𝒉
𝒅𝒕
 to be  a 
change in lump sum income per unit change in tax, 𝑬𝝑
𝒉 =  [
𝝏𝑬𝒉
𝝏𝝑𝒉
] = [
𝝏𝒖𝒉
𝝏𝝑𝒉
] , expenditure 
function of the household that gives minimum expenditure necessary to obtain level of utility 
𝒖𝒉, 𝝅𝒛
𝒇
=
𝝏𝒀𝒇
𝝏𝝑𝒉
 , is the firms profit function. In the last expression of the derivative of 
government revenues to income this part is: ∑ 𝒈𝒉𝑯 = ?̅? − (∑ 𝝅𝒛
𝒇 𝒅𝒛𝒇
𝒅𝒕𝑭
− ∑ 𝑬𝝑
𝒉 𝒅𝒛
𝒉
𝒅𝒕𝑯
) .𝑭 and 
𝒇’s are firms. Or if 𝚷𝒕 = 𝝅𝒛
𝒇 𝒅𝝑𝒇
𝒅𝒕
, 𝑩𝒕 = 𝑬𝝑
𝒉 𝒅𝝑
𝒇
𝒅𝒕
,For the equilibrium to be optimal following 
condition should apply: 
𝒅𝒈𝒓
𝒅𝒕
= (𝚷𝒕 − 𝑩𝒕) = 𝟎. As for the optimal taxes one has: 
𝒅?̅?
𝒅𝒕
∗ 𝒕 =
−(𝚷𝒕 − 𝑩𝒕) ⇒ 𝒕 = −(𝚷𝒕 − 𝑩𝒕) (
𝒅?̅?
𝒅𝒕
)
−𝟏
. Now if markets are incomplete as in previous 
definition in Arrow-Debreu sense, then changes in demand change market prices will change 
the nature of composite product, so externalities will exist and adverse selection will apply 
to the economy. In Stiglitz model there are two period only. In the  𝑺(𝟐) = 𝒌  and 𝑺 = 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐 
, vector of prices is : 𝒑 = 𝒑𝟏, 𝒑𝟐, … … , 𝒑𝒌.Family holdings in period zero are : 𝑾𝟎
𝒉, and 
household utility is: 𝑼𝒉(𝑾𝟎
𝒉; 𝒑) = ∑ 𝒖𝟐𝒌
𝒉
𝒌 (𝒙𝒌
𝒉∗; 𝑾𝟎
𝒉, 𝒑𝒌)𝚿𝒌 , where 𝒖𝟐𝒌
𝒉  is the utility of the 
consumption of good in period 2, 𝒙𝒌
𝒉∗ is the vector of consumption that maximizes household 
utility function at period 2, 𝚿𝒌 is probability that state 𝒌 materializes. This expression is 
subject to constraint: 𝒑𝒌?̃?𝒌
𝒉 ≤ 𝟎, ?̃?𝒌
𝒉 is the individuals  (second period) net traded vector, for 
commodity zero: ?̃?𝟎𝒌
𝒉 = ?̃?𝟎𝒌
𝒉∗ − 𝑾𝟎
𝒉. Fotr other commodities: ?̃?𝒋𝒌
𝒉 = ?̃?𝒋𝒌
𝒉∗ − 𝑾𝒋
𝒉.Household 
two period utility is a sum of utilities in the  two periods:  𝒖𝒉(𝑾𝟎
𝒉; 𝒑) = 𝒖𝟏
𝒉(?̅̅̅?𝒉 − 𝑾𝟎
𝒉) +
𝑼𝒉(𝑾𝟎
𝒉; 𝒑), where ?̅̅̅?𝒉 − 𝑾𝟎
𝒉 denotes consumption in period 1 of store of value of good, ?̅̅̅?𝒉   
is the total initial endowment of the good. Now in therms of incomplete market with two 
period utilities we can rewrite the 
𝒅𝒈𝒓
𝒅𝒕
 expression as: 
𝒅𝒈𝒓
𝒅𝒕
= ∑ ∑
𝒅𝑬𝒉𝒅𝒑𝒌
𝒅𝒑𝒌𝒅𝒕
𝚿𝒌 = ∑ (∑ ?̃?𝒌
𝒉
𝒉 ∗𝒌𝒌𝑯
𝒎𝒌
𝒉
𝑼𝟏
𝒉 )
𝒅𝒑𝒌
𝒅𝒕
𝚿𝒌, where 𝒎𝒌
𝒉 is marginal utility of income to household 𝒉 when 𝒔 = 𝒌 state is 
realized .So in conclusion there will exist taxes that improve overall welfare.   
                                           
1 ℎ is a part fo the consumption vector 𝑥ℎ = (𝑥1
ℎ, ?̅?ℎ), ?̅?ℎ is the consumption of the numeraire good. 
Utility is equal: 𝑢ℎ(𝑥ℎ, 𝜗ℎ), 𝜗ℎ are other variables that affect utility such as: levels of pollution, 
average quality of a good consumed. 𝜗ℎ = 𝛽ℎ𝑡1𝑥1, 𝛽
ℎ is the share of tax received back by some 
household ℎ, and ∑ 𝛽ℎ = 1𝐻 .Tax proceed redistributions are “externalities” to each household.  
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Law of one price on securities  
The payoff matrix of all Arrow securities must be identity (unit) matrix, Lengwiler (2004). 
In the common example the payoff matrix, that is collection of all Arrow type securities 
(elementary assets),1 𝑺 is unit matrix, i.e. integer matrix consisting of all 𝒔,  𝒆 ≔ [𝟏, {𝒎, 𝒏}]. 
And 𝐝𝐞𝐭(𝒎, 𝒏) ≠ 𝟎, and trace matrix should be 𝒕𝒓(𝒆) = ∑ 𝒂𝒊𝒊
𝑺
𝒔=𝟏 . An the same time Arrow 
prices are given as:𝜶 = [𝒂𝟏, … . , 𝒂𝒔]. Each of these Arrow prices, are given as product of 
financial markets prices and 𝑨−𝟏 ,or inverse matrix of the matrix of returns, (markets are 
only complete if returns matrix is invertible),  or ∏ 𝒒 ∙ 𝑨(𝒆𝒊)
−𝟏𝑺
𝒔=𝟏 .Now risk free rate of 
return (risk free interest rate)is equal to :𝝆 − 𝟏 =
𝟏
∑ 𝒂𝟏,𝒔
𝑺
𝒔=𝟏
 , where ∑ 𝒂𝟏,𝒔
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 = 𝜷 , and now 
risk neutral probabilities ?̃?𝒔are given as:  ?̃?𝒔 ≔ 𝝆𝒂𝒔. About the decomposition of the price 
of the option, one has: 𝒒𝒋 = 𝒂𝒓
𝒋. For the law of one price to holds, transaction costs must not 
exists, and there must be no bid-ask spread. And if two portfolios, produce the same cash 
flow 𝒓 ∗ 𝒛 = 𝒓 ∗ 𝒛′ , than they must also cost the same 𝒒 ∗ 𝒛 = 𝒒 ∗ 𝒛′.Risk neutral pricing is 
given as :𝑹𝒋
𝒔 ≔
𝒓𝒔
𝒋
𝒒𝒋
 ,where 𝑹𝒋
𝒔 is the gross rate of return of asset 𝒋 .Expected rate of return of 
any asset ,evaluated with risk neutral probabilities is given as :?̂?{𝑹𝒋} = 𝝆 .Here please note 
that: 𝝆 = 𝜷−𝟏. Asset span in the economy is given as:𝓜 = {𝒛 ∈ 𝑹𝒔 ≔ 𝒛 =
𝒉𝑹 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒉 ∈ 𝑹𝒋} , 𝓜 ⊆ 𝑹𝒔, in previous case markets are incomplete, but for markets 
to be complete 𝓜 = 𝑹𝒔. In the asset span of the economy function 𝒉 denotes holdings of 
security 𝒋, while 𝒉𝑹 denotes portfolio of payoffs ∑ 𝒉𝒋𝒓𝒋𝒋 . Now, 𝟏 ∈ 𝓜 is risk free payoff, 
riskless assets exists only when markets are complete. Let remember that,𝝋(𝝀𝒑) = 𝝋(𝒑), 
and 𝝀 = 𝟏, for excess demand function to be homogenous so one can denote payoff  as:𝝀𝟏 ∈
𝑹𝑺 , 𝝀 ∈ 𝑹 is state independent claim and 𝒒𝒔 ≡ 𝒒(𝒆𝒔), and 𝓜 = {𝒒𝜽: 𝒒 ∈ 𝑹
𝒋}.If there exist 
two states 𝒔 and 𝒔′ 𝒓𝒔
𝒋
≠ 𝒓𝒔′
𝒋
 . 
Tax cuts and fiscal policy  
Tax cut is defined as: ?̃?𝟎 − 𝝉𝟎 = −𝒅, and it is financed through debt, ?̃? − 𝝉 = (𝟏 + 𝒓)𝒅 =
−(𝟏 + 𝒓)?̃?𝟎 − 𝝉𝟎. Formally Ricardian equivalence to holds following applies: 𝚽(𝒕) =
𝒅(𝒕) − ∫ (𝝉(?̅?) − 𝑮(
∞
𝒕
?̅?) ∙ 𝒆−𝒓𝑨(𝒕,?̅?)𝒅𝒕 = 𝟎2. Government debt is equal to ?̇?(𝒕) =
𝒓(𝒕)𝒅(𝒕) + 𝑮(𝒕) − 𝝉(𝒕), Heijdra, B.J., F.Van Der Ploeg, (2002). In the first period tax cut is 
financed through debt, but in the second period taxes are increased, by the principal plus 
interest due on the issued debt. Tax cut should leave present value of government spending 
unchanged, but the risk free payoff paying (𝟏 + 𝒓) , does not mean that the risk free payoff 
belongs to the asset span, since 𝒓 > 𝟎 is exogenously determined, and it might or might not 
                                           
1 Contingent claims denominated in dollars, derivative with a payout that is dependent on the 
realization of some uncertain future event.(options, swaps, future contracts etc.). 
2 Actuarial revenue is 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡) + 𝑀(𝑡) , where 𝑀(𝑡) is instant probability for death.  
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belong to the asset span 𝓜, Divino, Orillo,(2017). Asset prices are 𝒒𝜽 ∈ 𝑹+
𝒋
, tax obligations 
are given as: 𝝉 = (𝝉𝟎, 𝒕𝟏) ∈ 𝑹++
𝟏+𝑺 ∀𝒉 ∈ 𝑯, and 𝐦𝐚𝐱
(𝒙𝟎,?̃?𝒔)∈𝜷𝒉(𝒒,𝓜,𝝉)
𝑼𝒉 = (𝒙𝟎, ?̃?𝒔), s.t. 2 period 
constraint:𝒙𝟎 + 𝒒𝜽 = 𝝎𝒐
𝒉 − 𝒕𝒐 ; 𝒙𝒔 = 𝝎𝒔
𝒉 + 𝒒𝒔𝜽 − 𝒕𝒔,taxpayer budget set it is defined as: 
𝜷𝒉(𝒒, 𝓜, 𝝉) = {𝒙 ∈ 𝑹+
𝟏+𝑺: ∃𝒛 ∈ 𝓜}: 𝒙𝟎 − 𝝎𝟎
𝒉 + ?̃?𝟎 = −𝒒𝜽, ?̃?𝒔 − ?̃?𝒔
𝒉 + ?̃?𝒔𝟏 = 𝒛, 𝒒: 𝓜 →
𝑹. If the tax cut previously defined is enacted then we will have: 𝒙𝟎 − 𝝎𝟎
𝒉 + ?̃?𝟎 = −𝒒𝜽 − 𝒅, 
?̃?𝒔 − ?̃?𝒔
𝒉 + ?̃?𝒔 = 𝒒𝜽 + (𝟏 + 𝒓)𝒅.So , now question here is whether agents can neutralize 
(𝟏 + 𝒓)𝒅 , and not that government bonds are net wealth as in Barro,(1974). For the law of 
one price to apply here 𝜷𝒉(𝒒, 𝓜, 𝝉) = 𝜷𝒉(𝒒, 𝓜, ?̃?), ∃𝒛 ∈ 𝑹𝒔, ∃𝒛(𝒔′) = 𝒛 + (𝟏 + 𝒓)𝒅𝟏 ∈
𝓜 . RET holds if and only if it does not affect the individual demand sets defined as: 
𝝋𝒉(𝒑, 𝒒, 𝝉) = {𝒙 ∈ 𝜷𝒉(𝒑, 𝒒, 𝝉): ¬∃𝒙′ ∈ 𝜷𝒉(𝒑, 𝒒, 𝝉): 𝑼𝒉(𝒙′) > 𝑼𝒉(𝒙)}. The last expression 
is in line with the second welfare theorem where if economy is specified by:  
Equation 10 
({𝒙 ≿𝒋}𝒋=𝟏
𝒋
, {𝒙′}𝒔=𝟏
𝑺 , 𝝎𝒐
𝒉) , 𝒇𝒐𝒓 (𝒙, 𝒙′), ∃𝒑 = (𝒑𝟏, … 𝒑𝒔)⋁𝒒 = (𝒒𝟏, … 𝒒𝒔 ≠
𝟎, ∃(𝝎𝟏, … 𝝎𝒔), ∑ 𝝎𝒔 = 𝒑𝝎𝒔
𝒉
𝒔 + ∑ 𝒑𝒊𝒙′𝒊 ,  
Previous constitutes pseudoequilibrium with transfers and that is: 
∀𝒔, 𝒙′, 𝐦𝐚𝐱 𝒑𝒙𝒔 ≤ 𝒑𝒙
′, ∀𝒙 ∈ 𝑹+
𝑺 , and ∀𝒋, 𝒊𝒇 𝒙𝒋 ≻ 𝒙𝒋
′ ∥ 𝒒𝒋𝒙𝒋 ≥ 𝝎𝒋 and ∑ 𝒙′𝒔 = 𝝎𝒔
𝒉 +𝒔
∑ 𝒙𝒋
′
𝒋 .In such a case 𝝀𝒙 + (𝟏 − 𝝀)𝒙′ ∈ 𝑹++
𝟏+𝒔 ∈ ℝ𝑵 is convex where 𝝀 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏].This is also 
known as Separating hyperplanes theorem in other words, 𝑹++
𝟏+𝒔 ⊂ ℝ𝑵 is convex if it contains 
two vectors 𝒙 and 𝒙′ , and a segment that connects them. Now, law of one price holds if ∈
𝓜 , but in the model public debt is not available for consumers to purchase. Only risky assets 
are available for them to try to replicate risk free payoff. RET does not hold if 𝟏 ∉ 𝓜. Now 
if we define:  
Equation 11  
𝐈𝐦𝓜 = {𝒒(𝒆𝟏, … . . , 𝒆𝒋) ∈ (𝑹
𝑺)
𝒋
: 𝑭(𝒛) = 𝒒 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒛 ∈ 𝑽}
𝐊𝐞𝐫𝓜 = 𝒛 ∈ 𝑽: 𝑭(𝒛) = 𝟎
 
Set of linear mapping function would be given as:  
Equation 12 
𝓕 = {(𝒆𝟏, … . . , 𝒆𝒋) ∈ (𝑹
𝑺)
𝒋
: 𝒒(𝒆𝟏, … . . , 𝒆𝒋) = 𝟎} 
We note here that Fourier transform of a common function  is given as:𝓕𝒙[𝟏](𝒌) =
∫ 𝒆−𝟐𝝅𝒊𝒌𝒙𝒅𝒙 = 𝜹(𝒌)
+∞
−∞
, or Fourier transformation of a delta function is : 𝓕𝒙[𝜹(𝒙 −
𝒙𝟎)(𝒌)] = ∫ 𝒆
−𝟐𝝅𝒊𝒌𝒙+∞
−∞
𝜹(𝒙 − 𝒙𝟎)𝒅𝒙 = 𝒆
−𝟐𝝅𝒊𝒌𝒙, 𝓕𝒙
−𝟏 = 𝜹[(𝒙)𝒌] = ∫ 𝜹(𝒙)𝒆𝟐𝝅𝒊𝒌𝒙𝒅𝒙 =
+∞
−∞
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𝟏. Now since, (𝑹𝑺)
𝒋
= 𝟏 , in our case Fourier transform of one is 1, since 𝐑𝐚𝐧𝐤(𝑹𝑺) = 𝟏.If 
𝑲𝒆𝒓(𝓜) = 𝟎, than its dimension is given as: 𝐝𝐢𝐦(𝑲𝒆𝒓𝓜) = 𝐝𝐢𝐦(𝑲𝑵) − 𝐝𝐢𝐦(𝑰𝒎𝓜) =
𝒏 − 𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒌(𝓜) = 𝟏 − 𝟏 = 𝟎.This is actually the distance (𝟏𝓜). Now since delta function, 
is continuous and is close there exists complement of 𝑺 which is an open set. In this open set 
one cannot expect to replicate risk free payoffs. This is because the complement set has its 
own limit points, and has its own set closure, has its own neighborhood, disjoint of 𝑺, Croft, 
Falconer, and Guy, K.(1991) 𝓡 ⊂ 𝑹𝑱𝑺, ∀(𝒆𝟏, … . . , 𝒆𝒋), 𝐑𝐚𝐧𝐤𝓜 = 𝟎, 𝐑𝐄𝐓 𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐬.Since the 
set of endogenous variables is :𝚯 ≔ {𝜽 ∈ 𝑹𝑱: 𝒒𝜽 = 𝟏}, since the rank of 𝑽 is full (vectors 
are linearly dependent), and it is an injective transformation. Therefore, the Lebesque 
measure is:𝝁𝑳(𝑺
′) = (𝒃 − 𝒂) − ∑ (𝒃𝒌 − 𝒂𝒌)𝒌 = 𝟎. Hence, agent cannot replicate risk free 
payoff.  
Concluding remarks  
This paper proved that if the law of one price holds than RET holds if agents are able to 
replicate risk free payoffs. The result is applied on the incomplete markets model. Under the 
law of one price agents are not affected by the changes of fiscal policy in terms of the risk 
free payoff as long as that payoff belongs to the fixed payoff matrix. But if columns 𝑱 of 
payoff matrix vary law of one price will not hold, hence RET will not hold too. 
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